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Abstract
In this paper I offer a fairly complete account of the idea of social discount rates as applied to
public policy analysis. I show that those rates are neither ethical primitives nor observables as
market rates of return on investment, but that they ought instead to be derived from economic
forecasts and society’s conception of distributive justice concerning the allocation of goods and
services across personal identities, time, and events. The welfare theory is developed in the
context of three empirical studies on the economics of global climate change. I argue that the
theoretical foundations of intergenerational welfare economics are still unsettled even in
deterministic models. The standard precautionary motive for saving is then reviewed in the case
where future uncertainties are not large. I then show that if the uncertainties associated with
climate change and biodiversity losses are large, the formulation of intergenerational well-being
we economists have grown used to could lead to ethical paradoxes even if the uncertainties are
thin-tailed: an optimum policy may not exist. Various modelling avenues that offer a way out of
the dilemma are discussed. It is shown that none of them is entirely satisfactory.
JEL Classification: C61, D53, D9, G12
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uncertainty, inequality aversion, risk aversion, rate of time preference, hyperbolic discouning,
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Discounting Climate Change
Partha Dasgupta
Introduction
Imagine someone who has been reading articles and watching documentaries on climate change.
She is persuaded that rising concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is a major
contributor to the process. She knows that even though the global warming associated with
climate change is slow in comparison to the speed of contemporary economic growth, the carbon
concentrations expected to be reached at the end of this century under business as usual haven’t
been harboured by Earth’s atmosphere in the past several million years. This scares her. However,
she realises that although the investment required to curb the process - controlling carbon emissions,
enlarging sequestration possibilities, and investing in alternative energy technologies - are large,
the benefits will be enjoyed only many decades from now. Which is why she is not only anxious
about climate change, she is also at a loss to know how to think about the matter.
As our protagonist is a citizen of a functioning democracy, she wants to instruct her political
leaders to start discussions with governments of other countries on what, as she sees it, is a
global commons problem. That is why she now seeks a grammar that can join her understanding
of the way the world works (the ways in which people would choose under various circumstances,
the pathways Nature chooses, the consequences of those choices, and so on) to the basis on
which alternative global investment policies ought to be evaluated. As carbon emissions involve
massive externalities, she realises that in her role as a citizen she shouldn’t rely exclusively on her
private interests, but should instead adopt something like a social point of view, one that would
appear reasonable not only to her, but to others as well. This makes her want to take others into
account when deliberating over the costs and benefits of alternative investment policies. But she
realises that when it comes to climate change, most of those others will be people who are yet to
be born. So, she wants to know what contemporary economics has to say about her dilemma.
Our protagonist asks an economist friend to give her a reading list, complaining to him that
correspondents even in the most prominent newspapers never write about the questions that are
vexing her. The friend assures her that economics does have the conceptual tool she seeks, and
that it has already been put to use by contemporary economists for studying the economics of
climate change. He gives her three books to read: Cline (1992), Nordhaus (1994), and Stern
(2006).
Some days later our protagonist calls her friend to complain. She says she has now read the
books, but remains confused. Cline and Stern, she says, urge immediate, strong global action to
combat climate change - Stern, she notes, recommends what amounts to an annual expenditure
of 2% of the GDP of rich countries. But Nordhaus, she observes, claims that despite the threats
climate change poses to the global economy, it would be more equitable and efficient to invest in
reproducible capital and human capital now so as to build up the productive base of economies
- including, especially, poor countries - and to put into effect controls on carbon in an increasing,
but gradual manner, starting several decades from now. What confounds her, our protagonist
remarks, is that Cline and Stern, on the one hand, and Nordhaus, on the other, reach very
different conclusions even though they are all agreed that global GDP per capita can be expected
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to continue to grow over the next 100 years and more even under business as usual - at something
like 1-2% a year. What, she asks, is going on?
This article offers an account of what she wants to know.
1. Facts and Values
Reading the many reports on Stern (2006), published in newspapers and magazines at its launch
(31 October 2006) - interestingly, reading the book itself - would give one the impression that
the case built by the authors for strong, immediate action rests wholly on insights drawn from the
new and more refined global circulation models of climate scientists. In fact the conclusions
reached by Stern and his co-authors are implications of their choice of a pair of fundamental
ethical parameters - namely, the time discount rate and the elasticity of marginal felicity (defined
below) - they aren’t driven so much by the new climatic facts the authors have stressed. It so
happens, Cline (1992) postulated values for that same pair of parameters that, at least in the
context of the economic model of climate change he studied, were very close to the ones assumed
in Stern’s book (see below). In a symposium on his book, Cline (1993:4) summarised his findings
in words that reflect a point of view strikingly similar to that in Stern (2006): “My central scenario
shows that ... if risk aversion is incorporated by adding high-damage and low-damage cases and
attributing greater weight to the former, benefits comfortably cover costs (with a benefit-cost
ratio of about 1.3 to 1). Aggressive abatement is worthwhile even though the future is much
richer, because the potential massive damages warrant the costs.”
In contrast, the figure chosen for one of the two ethical parameters, namely, that for the time
discount rate (see below), in Nordhaus (1994) is so much higher than the ones chosen by Cline
(1992) and Stern (2006), that it leads him to advocate the upward-sloping “climate policy ramp”
of ever tightening reductions in carbon emissions our protagonist noticed in his work. The higher
figure chosen by Nordhaus obliges him to use a considerably higher rate to discount the future
costs and benefits associated with public economic policies.
All this must be well known to those who have followed recent discussions on the economics of
climate change. What hasn’t been studied in the commentaries, however, are the reasons underlying
the differences between Nordhaus, on the one hand, and Cline and Stern, on the other, over the
choice of the time discount rate. I believe those reasons have to do with differences in the way
welfare economics is read by the authors. So, although I begin by belabouring what could appear
to readers as rather self-evident points, I do so because it will prove useful for drawing out two
alternative ways of reading welfare economics.
Policy evaluation involves comparisons of different people’s wellbeing. We will call the person
doing the evaluation the social evaluator. The social evaluator could be a citizen (thinking about
things before casting his vote on political candidates), she could be an ethicist hired to offer
guidance to the government, he could be a government decision maker, and so on. In what
follows, I frequently adopt modern convention by replacing the “social evaluator” by “society”
and say, for example, that “society entertains the view...,” when I mean “the social evaluator
entertains the view ...”
Assume, as Cline, Nordhaus, and Stern do, that each person’s felicity (i.e. instantaneous utility)
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depends solely on his or her consumption level. By the “fundamental ethical parameters”, I mean
two things: (i) the tradeoffs that ought to be made between the felicities of the present and future
generations, given that future generations will be here only in the future; and (ii) the tradeoffs that
can justifiably be made between the consumptions people enjoy, regardless of the date at which
they appear on the scene. Technically, (i) is reflected in the time discount rate (we denote it here
by η); and (ii) is reflected in the elasticity of the social weight that ought to be awarded to a small
increase in an individual’s consumption level (we denote it here by δ). We confirm later that ä
reflects the way the future is seen through today’s telescope; while η is a measure of society’s
aversion to interpersonal inequality and risk in consumption. In the formulation we adopt here,
η is the elasticity of marginal felicity.
δ and η, as we have defined it above, are fundamental because they help to determine the
rates at which society ought to discount changes in future consumption. The other factor that
helps to determine those rates is society’s forecast of future consumptions. Discount rates on
consumption changes combine “values” with “facts.”
The ethical viewpoint I explore here is self-consciously anthropocentric. Nature has an intrinsic
value, but I ignore it because the three books on the economics of climate change I am responding
to ignore it. I don’t even accommodate the fact that people care about certain types of natural
capital as stocks (e.g., places of scenic beauty or sacred sites), because the books I discuss here
don’t consider it.1
2. Consumption Discount Rates: basics
For simplicity of exposition, let us suppose that the vector of consumption goods in the economy
can be aggregated into a single commodity, called consumption (C).2 Again, for simplicity of
exposition, imagine that a generation’s felicity can be aggregated from individual felicities in such
a way that it depends solely on the generation’s average consumption level. Next imagine that
society entertains no uncertainty and has made a forecast of future consumptions. Society now
conducts a thought experiment on its forecast by asking how much additional consumption it
would demand on behalf of tomorrow’s people in payment for a reduction in today’s consumption
by one unit. We say that the “social rate of discount” between today’s and tomorrow’s
consumptions is that additional consumption demanded, less unity. So, if ρ is that rate, society
would demand (1+ρ) units of additional consumption tomorrow as a price for giving up one unit
of consumption today; meaning that society regards an additional unit of consumption tomorrow
to be worth 1/(1+ρ) units of additional consumption today. In order to stress that society is
deliberating over a consumption swap between today and tomorrow, we say that  is the
consumption discount rate. As would be expected, consumption discount rates play a central
role in social cost-benefit analysis (Marglin, 1963; Arrow and Kurz, 1970; Dasgupta et al.,
1972; Lind, 1982; Arrow et al., 1996; Portney and Weyant, 1999).
The definition of consumption discount rates given above is very general: it isn’t based on any particular
conception of intergenerational justice, nor on any specific formulation of the idea of intergenerational
wellbeing. In order to put the definition to work, we need to specify the latter. In Section 3, I do so.
However, any mention of “discount rates,” and one thinks immediately of positive numbers. But
should society discount future consumption costs and benefits at a positive rate?
1 Heal (1998, 2007) and Hoel and Sterner (2007) study inter-generational welfare economics when individual
felicities depend on stocks of environmental capital
2 For the analysis involving multiple consumption goods, see Sterner and Perrson (2007).
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There are two reasons why it may be reasonable to do so. First, an additional unit of consumption
tomorrow would be of less value than an additional unit of consumption today if society is impatient
to enjoy that additional unit now. Therefore, impatience is a reason for discounting future costs
and benefits at a positive rate. Second, considerations of justice and equality demand that
consumption should be evenly spread across the generations. So, if future generations are likely
to be richer than us, there is a case for valuing an extra unit of their consumption less than an extra
unit of our consumption, other things being equal. Rising consumption provides a second
justification for discounting future consumption costs and benefits at a positive rate.
A number of questions arise: How should society choose consumption discount rates? How are
they related to notions of intergenerational justice and equity? Should they be constant over time
or could they depend on date? Do they reflect the “opportunity cost” of capital; if so, how should
society determine what that cost is? Can they be inferred from “market observables,” such as
risk-free interest rates on government bonds? Must consumption discount rates be positive or
are there circumstances when they would be negative? And how should we price future
consumption when that future is uncertain?
In this paper I discuss tentative answers to those questions. I do that in stages. Section 3 considers
a deterministic world. In Sections 4 and 5 I introduce “small” and “large” uncertainties, respectively,
in future technology. Unfortunately, even the simplest analytical model of the economics of global
climate change (Dasgupta et al., 1999) is a lot more complicated than is necessary for our
discussion here. So, although climate change motivates this paper - I refer to it repeatedly - the
model I use as my workhorse doesn’t contain the phenomenon. Just so that we know how to
translate statements in the economic model studied here into corresponding statements in economic
models of climate change, we note that, to be concerned about future generations in models of
climate change means investing heavily so as to tame that change or to withstand the deleterious
effects of that change; whereas, to be concerned about future generations in our model translates
into high investment rates. Either way, the “present” foregoes consumption in favour of the “future”.
3. Intergenerational Well-Being: the deterministic case
As climate change involves the long run, we assume that population size is a constant, N. Individuals
are indexed by i (i = 1,2,...,N). Time is denoted by t and is taken to be discrete: t = 0,1,2,.... The
present is t = 0. When we come to perform numerical exercises below, we will often take the unit
of time to be a year.
Assume, as Cline, Nordhaus, and Stern do, that each generation’s felicity is the sum of the
felicities of its members. I follow the three authors in supposing that an individual’s felicity depends
solely on his current consumption level.3 If Cit and Ui(Cit), respectively, are i’s consumption level
and felicity at t, then social felicity at t is
3 This rules out the influence on an individual’s felicity of habitual consumption or the average consump-
tion of the person’s peer group. The implications of habitual consumption on social rates of discount
have been studied by Ryder and Heal (1973); the influence of peer group by Layard (1980, 2005) and Arrow
and Dasgupta (2007), among others.
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              Vt = i∑Ui(Cit).4 ..................................................................................................................................(1)
Cline, Nordhaus, and Stern focus on the intergenerational distribution of consumption. So, we
also bypass intra-generational issues by supposing that a generation’s felicity depends only on its
average consumption level, C. One way to conceptualise the assumption is to imagine a world
with identical individuals. Write Ct for consumption at t and U(Ct) for felicity at t. We take it that
marginal felicity is positive (U'(C) > 0), but declines with increasing consumption (U”(C) < 0).5
The curvature of U(C), as measured by the elasticity of U'(C,) plays a crucial role in
intergenerational welfare economics. In keeping with a vast literature, I assume that the horizon is
infinite (but see Section 6). {Ct} denotes the infinite sequence (C0, C1, ..., Ct, ...) and {U(Ct)},
the corresponding felicity sequence (U(C0), U(C1), ..., U(Ct), ...).
If the time discount rate is δ (≥0), intergenerational well-being at t = 0, which we write as
W0, is understood to be the present-value of the U(Ct)s. Thus,
W0 = U(C0) + U(C1)/(1+δ) + ... + U(Ct)/(1+δ)t + ... = t=0∑∞[U(Ct)/(1+δ)t]. .........(2)
In expression (2) U is unique up to positive affine transformations.6
The time discount rate in expression (2) is constant. In contrast, Arrow (1999) has appealed to
a form of “agent-relative” consequentialist ethics to recommend a variable time discount rate.
Using a functional form made famous by Phelps and Pollak (1968), Arrow proposes that each
generation should award equal weight to the felicities of all subsequent generations, but a higher
weight to its own felicity relative to that awarded to subsequent generations. Arrow’s formulation
is a special case of hyperbolic time discounting.
As I understand it, though, agent-relative ethics (e.g., Scheffler, 1992) responds to the demands
an individual is justified in making when he deliberates over alternative courses of action in the
private sphere. In this paper I study decisions in the public sphere (after all, climate change
involves a “commons” problem). Expression (2) offers a form of ethical guidance that discourages
public officials from being self-indulgent, or from contaminating his judgment with his personal
interests. In any event, I want to stay close to Cline, Nordhaus, and Stern, all of who have used
expression (2) as the basis of their studies.
Although it is ubiquitous in intergenerational welfare economics, expression (2) suffers from a
serious conceptual weakness: it doesn’t admit any concept of the “self” that lives through time.
The ethical calculus at the basis of the formula treats differences between an individual’s felicities
in two periods of time in the same way as it treats differences between the felicities of two
4 Expression (1) has the structure of “utilitarianism”, though not necessarily its classical interpretation (see
below). Some ethicists have proposed an ethical theory they call “prioritarianism”, which says that an
increase in the well-being of a rich person (i.e., someone who enjoys a high consumption level) should be
assigned less social value than the same increase in the well-being of a poor person (someone whose
consumption level is low). I have not understood why such an ad hoc ethical principle should be awarded
a name. I would have thought the utilitarian who is averse to inequality in consumption has it right: he
assigns a lower social value to an increase in the consumption level of a rich person than to the same
increase in the consumption level of a poor person.
5 We write 'U (C) = dU(C)/dC and U”(C) = d 'U (C)/dC.
6 If we wished to study the intra-generational distribution of consumption as well, the simplest move would
be to disaggregate each generation by imagining that there are N people at each date (i = 1,2,...,N), as in
expression (1), and assuming that people have the same felicity function, U. Intergenerational well-being
at t = 0 would then be W0 = t=0∑ ∞ [Vt/(1+δ)t] = t=0∑[i∑{U(Cit)/(1+δ)t}].
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individuals in those same two periods of time. The lifetime wellbeing of a person is constructed in
the same way as intergenerational wellbeing is constructed; which is to say that, even though a
person lives for many periods, she is regarded as a distinct self in each period. It can be argued,
however, that for someone to ask oneself, “how much should I save for my children?” involves
ethics that are different from those pertinent when that same person asks, “how should I spread
out my consumption over time?” Expression (2) encapsulates a framework for addressing the
former question and is the one used in each of the three books I am discussing here. So I make
use of it.7
How should the social evaluator choose U? It has become customary in the welfare economics
of climate change to infer the felicity function from the choices people make as they go about their
lives (Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 1994, 2007; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Stern, 2006; Weitzman,
2007a - see section 3.4). But there are several philosophical viewpoints that give rise to expression
(2) in which U is not necessarily felicity in the sense that has become familiar in the literature on
“revealed preference.” For example, Harsanyi (1955) constructed a theory that was independently
developed by Rawls (1972) into a far-reaching theory of justice based on choice behind a “veil
of ignorance” as to the position the chooser would occupy in society. In the context of
intergenerational justice, the chooser’s ignorance would be about the generation he is to join.
Unlike Rawls, Harsanyi argued that a rational chooser would interpret his ignorance to be an
“equal” chance of belonging to any generation. Dasgupta and Heal (1979: Ch. 9) used an argument
due to Yaari (1965) to show that intergenerational well-being in Harsanyi’s theory would be
expression (2) if society faces extinction at a constant hazard rate, δ > 0 (see Section 4). Moreover,
if the chooser were risk averse behind the veil of ignorance, U in the Harsanyi-Rawls theory
would not be felicity, but an increasing, concave function of felicity.
In contrast, Koopmans (1960, 1972) studied the idea of intergenerational wellbeing by imposing
a set of ethical requirements on orderings over felicity sequences. It was found, remarkably, that
if an ordering is continuous and Paretian, it must necessarily reflect impatience. A further
requirement imposed by Koopmans, which he named “stationarity”, is a near-cousin of the demand
that value judgments be universalizable, which in the present context means that the ordering
over a set of felicity sequences should be the same no matter which generation constructs it.
Koopmans showed that if a further requirement, “independence”, is added, intergenerational
wellbeing takes the form of expression (2).8 Impatience means that δ > 0. Although Koopmans
didn’t study the issue of equity across the generations, equity considerations would demand that
U in expression (2) be an increasing, concave function of felicity. (Rawls, 1972, would call
Koopmans’ formulation “intuitionist”.)
In further contrast, Ramsey (1928) interpreted expression (2) - with δ = 0 - in classical utilitarian
terms. But he didn’t presume that U is to be calibrated from market choices. (Rawls, 1972,
7  In work under preparation, I have tried to construct a framework that builds an intergenerational welfare
economics admitting the idea of selfhood. The model I have constructed permits someone to discount his
own future felicities in any way he likes (that’s the demand of his “self”), but requires of him to give a weight
to the lifetime wellbeing of each of his children that equals the weight he gives to his own lifetime wellbeing.
The model would seem to reconcile the widespread finding from consumption behaviour that people do
discount their future felicities at a non-negligible positive rate (see below) and the philosophical injunction
that many people would seem to adhere to, namely, that they should not discriminate against their children’s
futures (see below).
8 Roughly, the “independence” assumption amounts to the requirement that the marginal rate of societal
indifference between felicities in any two periods is independent of the felicities in all other periods.
SANDEE Working Paper No. 33-08 7
would call Ramsey’s formulation “teleological”.) As I am not restricting myself to classical
utilitarianism, let alone utilitarianism founded on revealed preference, we will be able to explore a
far wider range of ethical considerations than have been admitted in the recent economics literature.
Which is why we should note that by felicity (U) I shall mean a generation’s well-being.
3.1 Consumption Discount Rates in the Imperfect Economy
Begin by imagining that our social evaluator is given a consumption forecast {Ct} at t = 0, which
he converts into a forecast of well-beings {U(Ct)}. Assuming that the series in expression (2)
converges, this yields a figure for intergenerational wellbeing W0. δ is the time discount rate in
expression (2). We now provide a formula for the consumption discount rate, ρt, defined earlier.
Let ∆Ct and ∆Ct+1 denote “small” variations in Ct and Ct+1, respectively, and assume that the
pair of variations leaves the numerical value of W0 unchanged. Denote by g(Ct) the percentage
rate of change in the consumption that has been forecast between t and t+1.9 Let η be the
elasticity of marginal felicity, which is a measure of the curvature of U(C).10 Although there is
no obvious reason why η should be independent of C, I follow Cline, Nordhaus, and Stern and
assume that η is a constant. The class of Us for which η is constant is given by the form
U(C) = C(1-η)/(1-η), for η > 0 and η ≠ 1,
and U(C) = lnC, corresponding to η = 1.  (3)
The larger is η, the greater is the curvature of U(C). Notice that U(C) is bounded above but
unbounded below if η > 1, whereas U(C) is bounded below but unbounded above if η < 1.11
On using expression (2), we obtain
1 + ρ1 = (1+δ)(1+g (Ct))η.12        (4)
Equation (4) gives a precise expression to the intuitive reason that was offered earlier as to why
the social evaluator would be ethically correct to discount changes in future generations’
consumption levels when comparing them with changes in the consumption level of the present
generation.
The formula for  ρ1 reduces to a familiar approximation when δ and g(Ct) are both small. So,
suppose they are small. Then equation (4) becomes
            ρ1 ≈ δ + ηg(Ct).13 (4a)
9 So, Ct+1/Ct = 1+g(Ct). (F1)
10  Formally, η = -CU”(C)/ 'U (C) > 0.
 11 Arrow (1965) observed that the simplest U that is bounded at both ends is one for which η is an increasing
function of C and is less than 1 at low values of C and greater than 1 at high values of C.
12 Proof: Because the pair of variations ∆Ct+1 and ∆Ct leave the numerical value of expression (2)
unaltered, 'U (Ct)∆Ct/(1+δ)t + 'U (Ct+1)∆Ct+1/(1+δ)t+1 = 0. (F2)
By definition,  = -∆Ct+1/∆Ct - 1, (F3) where ∆Ct+1 and ∆Ct satisfy equation (F2). Now use equations (3),
(F1)-(F3) to obtain equation (4) in the text.
13 Proof: Take the logarithm of both sides of equation (4) and, using the fact that if x is small in absolute
value, ln(1+x)x, the approximate equation (4a) follows.
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If the interval between dates was to be made smaller and smaller, expression (4a) would be a
better and better approximation. It is simple to prove that if time is continuous, expression (4a) is
an exact equality (see, e.g., Arrow and Kurz, 1970).
Notice the way δ, η, and the forecast, g(Ct), together determine  ρ1. Observe in particular  ρ1 that
increases with δ and η(Ct), respectively, and increases with η if and only if g(Ct) > 0. I have
highlighted the qualifier “if and only if” for a good reason. In studying long run economic
development, it has become a habit among economists to confine attention to forecasts in which
consumption increases indefinitely. Equation (4) or, equivalently, equation (4a), says that when
g(Ct) > 0, δ and η play similar roles in the determination of ρ1: a higher value of either parameter
would reflect a greater aversion toward consumption inequality. Which may explain why it hasn’t
been uncommon to suppose that higher values of ä reflect a greater ethical concern for consumption
equality. But if g(Ct) < 0, δ and η assume diametrically opposite features: in contrast to η, higher
values of δ raise ρ1, implying an ethical preference for even greater inequality in consumption
across the generations.
In expression (2), {Ct} is assumed to be a forecast, nothing more. At this point we are not
assuming that {Ct} is an optimum consumption programme for society (but see Section 3.2).
The forecast is based on society’s reading of technological possibilities, households preferences,
current and future government policies, and so forth. To make a forecast requires an understanding
of the political economy of society.
Equations (4) and (4a) give quantitative expression to the pair of reasons offered earlier for
discounting future consumption gains and losses - namely, “impatience” and “intergenerational
equity.” As noted earlier, the larger is δ, the larger is ρt, other things being equal. So we turn to the
influence of η on ρt. η is an index of the curvature of U. Equations (4) and (4a) say that if
g(Ct)≠0, the larger is η, the larger is the absolute value of ρt, other things being equal. This proves
Proposition 1. η is the index of the aversion society ought to display toward consumption
inequality among people - be they people in the same period or in different periods.
It will prove useful to table the most-preferred values of δ and η in Cline (1992), Nordhaus
(1994), and Stern (2006).
Cline: δ = 0; η = 1.5
Nordhaus: δ = 3% a year; η = 1
Stern: δ = 0.1% a year; η = 1
In the context of equation (4a), notice how close the authors are in their choice of η. Notice also
how close Cline and Stern are in their specifications of δ. In Section 3.4 we ask why, among the
three, Nordhaus is such an outlier in his choice of δ. Here we note that to say that η = 1 is to insist
that any proportionate increase in someone’s consumption level ought to be of equal social worth
to that same proportionate increase in the consumption of anyone else who is a contemporary,
no matter how rich or poor that contemporary happens to be. It is also to insist that, if in addition
δ  = 0, any given proportionate increase in consumption today ought to be of equal social worth
to that same proportionate increase in consumption at any future date, no matter how rich or poor
people will be at that future date. Taken at face value, though, it isn’t immediate whether such tradeoffs
are ethically reasonable. In Section 3.2 we run more informative tests. They confirm that the pair
(δ ≈ 0, η = 1) can recommend bizarre policies in classroom models of consumption and saving.
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For computational purposes, it helps to assume that expression (4a) is a good approximation. I
summarise the points it makes:
(a) ρt is not a primary ethical object, it has to be derived from an overall conception of
intergenerational well-being and the consumption forecast: consumption discount rates cannot
be plucked from air. (b) Just as growing consumption provides a reason why discount rates in
use in social cost-benefit analysis should be positive, declining consumption would be a reason
why they could be negative. Example: Suppose δ  = 0, η = 2, and g(Ct) = -1% per year. Then
pt= -2% per year. Such reasoning assumes importance when we come to discuss that people in
the tropics, who are in any case very poor, will very likely suffer greatly from climate change
under business as usual (Section 3.5). The reasoning takes on an interesting application when we
come to consider uncertainty in future consumption (Sections 4 and 5).14 (c) If inter-temporal
external diseconomies are substantial, as is the case with climate change under business as usual,
both pt and private rates of return on investment could be positive for a period of time, even while
the social rate of return on investment is negative.15 (d) Only in a fully optimizing economy (Section
3.2) is it appropriate to discount future consumption costs and benefits at the rate that reflects the
direct opportunity cost of capital. In imperfect economies ρt should be used to discount consumption
costs and benefits, but the capital deployed in projects ought to be re-valued so as to take
account of the differences between ρt and the various rates of return on investment (Section 3.3).
Note though that the re-valued cost of capital would be less than the price of consumption if the
social rate of return on investment in that form of capital is less than ρt. (e) Unless consumption is
forecast to remain constant, social discount rates depend on the numeraire: ρt = δ  if and only if
g(Ct) = 0. (f) If g(Ct) varies with time, so does ρt. For example, suppose it is forecast that long-
run consumption growth is not sustainable but will decline at a constant rate of 1% a year - from
the current figure of 2% a year to zero. Suppose δ  = 0 and η = 2. In that case ρt will decline over
time at 1% a year, from a current-high 4% a year, to zero. Note that the “hyperbolic” discounting
that comes with a declining value of g(Ct) does not lead to time inconsistency over project
evaluation. As intergenerational wellbeing is reflected in expression (2), social preferences are
inter-temporally consistent. In other words, that ρt will decline over time at 1% a year doesn’t
mean that future generations will be enjoying the gift from the present generation of a “preferential
discount rate.”
The point estimate of consumption growth under business as usual in Stern (2006) is g(Ct) =
1.3% a year. Using this in equation (4a), we find that:
ρt = 2.05% a year for Clineρt = 4.30% a year for Nordhausρt = 1.40% a year for Stern
4.3% a year may not seem very different from 1.4% a year, but is in fact a lot higher when it is put
to work on the economics of the long run. Just how much higher can be seen from the fact that
14  I have friends in the US who find illustrations involving negative economic growth to be unrealistic. In
fact a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffered from negative growth during the period 1970-
2000. What discount rates should government project evaluators there have chosen in 1970 if they had an
approximately correct forecast of the shape of things to come?
15 See Dasgupta et al. (1999). This parallels the well-known fact that if the external disbenefits arising from
someone’s use of a commodity are large enough, the commodity’s shadow price will be negative even
when its market price is positive.
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the present-value of a given loss in consumption, owing, say, to climate change 100 years from
now, if discounted at 4.3% a year is seventeen times smaller than the present-value of that same
consumption loss if the discount rate used is 1.4% a year. The moral is banal: If the time horizon
is long, even small differences in consumption discount rates can mean large differences in the
message cost-benefit analysis gives us. The reason Cline (1992) and Stern (2006) have
recommended that the world spends substantial sums today to tame climate change, while
Nordhaus (1994) has recommended a far more gradualist investment policy can be traced to the
difference in their choice of δ.16 In contrast to these authors, I suggest below that, while it is
reasonable to set δ=0, values for η larger than 1.5 should be considered, in the range [2,3], but
perhaps even beyond that range.
How great is inequality aversion when the figure for η is in the range [2,3]? One way to answer
would be to study consumption changes among contemporaries that are judged by expression
(1) to be ethically equivalent.17 Consider two people, 1 and 2, with identical U-functions, whose
annual consumptions (at purchasing power parity) are $360 and $36,000, respectively. The
former is below even the World Bank’s “dollar-a-day” person, while the latter is well above the
annual income of the average resident of the European Union, which is approximately $29,000
(see World Bank, 2007). An easy calculation shows that if η = 2, our social evaluator would
regard a 50% decrease in person 2’s consumption to be ethically equivalent to a 1% decrease in
person 1’s consumption.
Does that look reasonable? A 50% decrease in 2’s consumption will give him $18,000, which is
still a huge figure (the per capita GDP in the World Bank’s “upper middle-income” country is
$11,000), whereas a 1% drop for individual 1 will bring his consumption down further to $356.40.
Some people, but perhaps not many, would find this trade-off to be reasonable. But what if η =
3? A similar calculation shows that in that case a 1% decrease in person 1’s consumption would
be ethically equivalent to a 93% drop in 2’s consumption. A 93% drop in consumption leaves
individual 2 with $2,520 (which is the per capita GDP in the World Bank’s “low-income” country),
as against the $356.40 going to individual 1. If this trade-off feels unreasonable, we should ask
whether the thought experiment we are conducting is itself reasonable. After all, our attitude
toward income transfers is influenced not only by our concern for equality of outcome, but also
by the recognition that incentives matter. Incentives in turn are shaped by the presence of moral
hazard and adverse selection. As our thought experiment is oblivious of incentives, it is of little
value in testing our intuition. So I turn to a thought experiment that is able to bypass some of those
worries by focusing on what a generation should leave behind for its descendents.
3.2 The Fully Optimum Economy
Consider the problem of optimum saving. A consumption sequence {Ct} is a full optimum if it
maximizes expression (2) in the set of all technologically feasible {Ct}s. We want to uncover how
the optimum {Ct} varies with η. For example, if a particular choice of η requires great sacrifices
from earlier generations in order that later generations will be able to enjoy very high consumption,
the η in question would not capture the idea of intergenerational equity in consumption.
16 Nordhaus (2007) confirms this by using Stern’s specifications for δ  and η in the climate-change model he
has developed over the past two decades. It should be noted that Nordhaus’ ρt = 4.30% a year is consis-
tent with the US government’s discount rate policy. On the latter, see Viscusi (2007).
 17 I am grateful to William Cline for correspondence on this way of studying how ç should be chosen
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It has proved unfruitful to test ethical intuitions in the “integrated assessment model” of climate
change that Nordhaus has studied and in the global climate models described in Stern (2006),
because it isn’t possible to track what is influencing what in huge computer runs. Simple classroom
production models are far better at informing us how η affects the relative ethical merits of
alternative consumption sequences. Moreover, as many people regard value judgments to be
“universalizable,” the range of ηs that is chosen for consideration should not only lead to reasonable
outcomes in the world we think we know, but also in worlds that are possible. The simplest
production structure by far is the pure capital model, in which output is a fixed proportion of
wealth. By wealth I mean not only reproducible capital, but also human capital (skills, knowledge,
and health) and those types of natural capital whose stocks generate a flow of production services
(e.g., ecosystem services). The rate of return on investment is taken to be a positive constant, r.
To eschew diminishing returns to the factors of production may seem odd in a paper that addresses
the economics of climate change, but in “wealth” I include every possible capital asset.18 And as
a check against unbridled optimism, I assume that there is no exogenous technological progress.
The latter assumption, however, requires justification.19 If our model economy were to enjoy
exogenous productivity growth, consumption could be made to increase faster than any constant
exponential rate. There is no evidence such patterns of growth have ever been experienced over
any extended period of time. In any case, we shouldn’t expect exogenous productivity growth in
our model: as no capital asset is left out from the production function, accounting for economic
growth doesn’t leave behind a “residual.” If labour productivity rises in our model economy, it is
because of investment in various forms of capital.
A more common way to model production is to assume that reproducible capital and labour are
imperfect substitutes; and that labour is a fixed factor, enjoying exogenous productivity growth.
The problem is that it isn’t possible to solve analytically for optimum consumption when the latter
isn’t very close to its long-run steady state. Mirrlees (1967) studied the sensitivity of optimum
consumption to δ and η outside steady state, but he had to take recourse to numerical methods.
Moreover, Mirrlees’ general findings are not at variance with those I report below. That r is
constant in the model I pursue allows me to offer a complete account of optimum consumption.
In Sections 4 and 5 we will find that the model offers me an easy route for studying the effect of
future uncertainty on today’s investment decision.
Following Cline, Nordhaus, and Stern, I suppose that η≥1. Consumption is assumed to take
place at the beginning of each period. Writing Kt for wealth at t, the economy’s accumulation
process can therefore be expressed as
Kt+1 = (Kt-Ct)(1+r) K0 (> 0) is given. (5)
In a fully optimum economy, the {Ct} that society chooses maximizes expression (2), subject to
the accumulation equation (5). But infinite sums, as is the case with expression (2), needn’t
converge. So, we must identify conditions under which an optimum {Ct} exists. The parameters
that specify our model economy r, δ, and η. Let us begin by pretending that an optimum {Ct}
exists and determine the condition it must satisfy. A simple argument shows that an optimum {Ct}
18  Quite obviously, I am making outrageous assumptions regarding aggregation of capital. In this I am no
different from contemporary growth economists.
19  It requires justification because Professor Brad De Long took me to task over it in the critique he posted
on his blog on November 30, 2006, under the title, “Partha Dasgupta Makes a Mistake”. His piece was a
response to the review of Stern (2006) that was published in Dasgupta (2007).
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must satisfy
ρt= r for all t  0.20 (6)
Equation (6) says that r is the consumption discount rate in a fully optimum economy and only in
a fully optimum economy. So we conclude that it is only in a fully optimum economy that the
direct opportunity cost of capital should be used for discounting future benefits and costs.
What does an optimum {Ct} look like? Using equations (4) and (6), we note that Ct grows at the
compound rate, g, where
Ct+1/Ct - 1 = g = [(1+r)/(1+δ)]1/η - 1. (7)
From equation (5) it follows that Kt grows at the same rate. If r and δ are small, then g is small,
and equation (7) becomes the approximation
             g ≈ (r-δ)/η.21 (7a)
Equation (7) tells us that, along the optimum, consumption grows if r > δ, but declines if r < δ.
The interesting case is where r > δ.22 In that case the optimum economy experiences positive
growth. In what follows, we assume that r > δ.
A macroeconomic variable for which we all have an intuitive feel is the “saving rate.” In our
model the concept has two meanings. Because consumption takes place at the beginning of each
period, the saving rate at t is saving as a proportion of wealth at t, that is, (Kt-Ct)/Kt. This is the
first meaning. And because both Ct and Kt grow at the same rate, the optimum saving rate is a
constant. So, our search for the optimum saving rate reduces to a search for that constant rate of
saving that maximizes expression (2). Writing the optimum saving rate as s*, routine calculations
show that,
s* = (1+r)-(η-1)/η(1+δ)-1/η. (8)
Now recall equation (5). It says that net saving is zero if s = (1+r)-1, implying that Ct is constant
if the saving rate equals (1+r)-1. At the other extreme is a saving rate of unity, which is associated
with the worst possible consumption sequence, because Ct = 0 for all t. We therefore want to
identify conditions under which s* in expression (8) is meaningful (i.e., s* < 1). We have assumed
that r > δ. This means s* > (1+r)-1. We now assume that either (i) η = 1 and δ > 0, or (ii) η > 1
and δ ≥ 0. In either case, s* < 1, implying that an optimum consumption programme exists.23 So
we have,
20 Proof: If ρt is less than r, society would be advised to save a bit more at t. But to save a bit more at t is to
consume a bit less at t, and this tilts consumption more toward the remaining future, which in turn
ρt raises.  Alternatively, if ρt exceeds r, society would be well advised to save a bit less at t. But to save a bit
less at t is to consume a bit more at t, and that tilts consumption more toward t, which in turn lowers ρt. It
follows that along the optimum Ct, ρt = r.
2 1 This is the same as approximation (4a), with r = ρt.
22 In Section 3.4 I suggest that in a deterministic world ä should be set equal to zero.
23 The rigorous argument would have us check that the saving rate in equation (8) satisfies the transversality
condition, namely, that the present discounted value of wealth (in well-being units) tends to zero as t
tends to infinity. Readers can check that it does.
SANDEE Working Paper No. 33-08 13
Proposition 2. The optimum saving rate is a decreasing function of η and δ. If, holding δ
and r constant, larger and larger values of η are admitted, s* declines to (1+r)-1.
The first part of Proposition 2 explains the sense in which η and δ, are fundamental ethical
parameters. The second part describes a limiting case. Solow (1974) observed that in one
interpretation of Rawls (1972), η = ∞. What Proposition 2 says is that, to assume η = ∞ is to
display infinite inequality aversion.
Citing consumer behaviour (Section 3.4), Nordhaus (1994) and Stern (2006) are in agreement
that η = 1, which, on using equation (8) implies that s* = 1/(1+δ). But in that case s* is independent
of r, a fact that should alone set off alarm bells that η = 1 reflects bad ethics. To see how bad the
ethics is, let us follow Stern by setting δ = 0.1% a year. Then s* = 1/1.001. Is this large or small?
To answer, we study the second interpretation of the saving rate in our model.
Because net saving is zero if s = 1/(1+r), we should normalise round that figure. Moreover, the
maximum possible rate of saving is 1, which implies that the range of non-negative saving rates is
[(1+r)-1, 1]. Since the saving-wealth ratio is (Kt-Ct)/Kt, its normalised value is [(Kt-Ct)/Kt-(1+r)
-
1]/[1-(1+r)-1]. Now, output at t+1 is rKt. It is easy to confirm that the normalised saving-wealth
ratio is none other than the more familiar saving-output ratio.24 Let         * be the optimum saving-
output ratio. Let us suppose both r and δ are small. Then routine calculations on expression (8)
show that
* ≈ (r-δ)/ηr. (8a)
If the unit interval of time were made smaller and smaller, (8a) would become a better and better
approximation. In the limit, where time is continuous, (8a) is an equality.
Suppose r = 4% a year. Approximation (8a) says that at δ = 0.1% a year,      * is 97%. This is an
absurdly high rate of saving out of income. Never mind that future generations will be vastly
richer: the present generation should not object! η = 1 doesn’t reflect much inequality aversion.25
If we are to smooth intergenerational consumption, larger values of η have to be admitted. Figures
in the range [2,3] suggest themselves. And if we are forced to go empirical on the matter, I can
cite Hall (1988), who estimated η to be broadly in the range [2,4] from consumer behaviour in
the US. Equation (8a) says that if η = 2, the optimum ratio of saving to output is approximately
49%; that if η = 3, it is approximately 32%; and that if η = 4, it is approximately 24%. These are
far more palatable figures.
24 Proof: Re-write equation (5) as Kt+1 - Kt = rKt - (1+r)Ct, which says that a consumption level of Ct at the
beginning of the period t is equivalent to the consumption level (1+r)Ct at the end of that period. So
saving out of output at the end of t is (rKt-(1+r)Ct). Therefore the ratio of saving to output is (rKt-(1+r)Ct)/
rKt, which, as is easily confirmed, equals the normalized saving-wealth ratio.
25  This result is very old. It dates back to Ramsey (1928). In defense of his choice of η=1,Stern (2008)
complains that the 97% saving rate I have just obtained is a feature of a very artificial model. Of course it
is. But “non”-artificial models, such as those Stern used in his computer runs don’t reveal which param-
eter is doing what work in generating his findings. How is one to test the robustness of ethical assump-
tions if not by putting them to work in stark, artificial models?
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3.3 Capital Revaluation in the Imperfect Economy
Imagine that, because of imperfections in the capital market, the saving rate doesn’t equal s*, but
is a constant, s, and that (1+r)-1 < s < s*. (The latter inequality implies that the economy is under-
investing for the future, while the former inequality implies that the economy enjoys growth.)
Consumption grows at the rate (s(1+r)-1), as do wealth and output. Let ρ be the consumption
rate of discount along the optimum. Equation (4) implies that
1 + ρ = (1+δ)sη(1+r)η. (9)
Because s < s*, we know from equations (6) and (9) that ρ < r.
If costs and benefits associated with investment projects are measured in terms of consumption,
ρ is the rate our social evaluator ought to use for evaluating projects. It is commonly argued
though, that, because r is the productivity of capital, the correct discount rate to use in social cost
benefit analysis is r. To use ρ as the discount rate runs the risk that relatively low-yielding projects
will crowd out high-yielding ones, or so the argument continues. And indeed, the practice of
using r in public policy contexts is familiar; for example, in the United States (see Viscusi, 2007).
The argument’s premise is wrong though. In the imperfect economy we are studying, r is not the
social rate of return on investment. So, investment needs to be re-valued in social cost-benefit
analysis.26 Let Pk be the shadow price of capital relative to consumption numeraire. Pk is the
social opportunity cost of capital: when a unit of capital is invested in a project, Pk is the present
discounted value of the flow of displaced consumption. Routine calculations yield,
             Pk = (1-s)(1+p)/[(1+p)-s(1+r)].27 (10)
We know that ρ = r if s = s*. But in that case, equation (10) says Pk = 1, which confirms that at
a full optimum, consumption and investment are equally valuable at the margin. However, as s <
s* in our imperfect economy, we have Pk > 1. Moreover, the smaller is s, the bigger is the gap
between r and , which in turn means the larger is Pk. So, even though we would use ρ to discount
future costs and benefits, a project would have to be high yielding to pass the cost-benefit test.
Of course, it may be that the project evaluator chooses investment as numeraire (as did Little
and Mirrlees, 1969). In that case consumption would have to be revalued at 1/Pk. Choice of
numeraire has no bearing on project selection.
3.4 Revealed Preference and Calibration, or, How Should Society Select δ and η?
Because capital is productive, later generations enjoy a natural advantage over earlier generations.
The expression for s* (equation (8)) says that if δ = 0 and η > ∞, the optimum policy for each
generation is to save so that future generations can be wealthier. That way, or so the ethical
reasoning goes, advantage can be taken of the productivity of capital. The lower is η, the larger
26 See Marglin (1963) and Dasgupta et al. (1972). Among economists writing on climate change, only Cline
(1992) has mentioned the need to revalue capital in imperfect economies.
27 Proof: a marginal additional unit of capital at t = 0 yields a small change in consumption, ∆Ct, equal to (1-
s)(s(1+r))t. At the consumption discount rate ρ , the present value of that small change, from 0 to ∞, is the
expression for Pk. (Note that, because s > (1+r)
-1, the present value exists.) Equation (10) is due to Marglin
(1963).
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is the optimum saving rate. Net positive saving ensures that consumption rises indefinitely, implying
that generations in the distant future will be far better off than the those alive now. If this is in
conflict with our immediate intuition regarding distributive justice, we have the choice of considering
larger values of either δ, or η, or both.
One influential school of philosophers has argued that societal impatience is ethically indefensible.
They say that to set δ > 0 is to favour policies that discriminate against the wellbeing of future
generations merely on the grounds that they are not present today.28 They also say that values
frequently in use among economists, ranging as they do between 2-3% a year, are way too high.
I find their argument hard to rebut. Admittedly, the ethical axioms Koopmans (1972) imposed on
infinite consumption sequences implies time discounting, but the axioms don’t say how large the
discount rate ought to be. Koopmans’ axioms are consistent with very, very low values of δ.29 In
contrast, to assume δ = 2% a year, as is routinely done in the economics literature, is to say that
the felicities of the next generation (35 years down the road) ought to be awarded half the weight
we award our own felicities. Justifying that is difficult. But once we accept the philosophers’
argument, we must turn to the second part of Proposition 2, which tells us that η is an index of
aversion to consumption inequality. The problem is that we have very little prior understanding of
what η implies as regards intergenerational saving. That’s why it is necessary to conduct sensitivity
analyses on equation (8) by varying η, which is what we have just done. Such exercises are
thought experiments, resembling laboratory tests. They give us a sense of how the interplay of
facts and values in complicated worlds tells us what we should do. Rawls (1972) called the
termination of iterative processes involving such thought experiments, “reflective equilibria.”
To illustrate, consider an optimizing society. We know that the growth rate of consumption,
g(Ct), satisfies equation (7). But that equation says that δ and η play similar roles in determining
the character of the optimum {Ct}: subject to r > δ, the larger is η or δ, the more even is the
intergenerational distribution of optimum consumption (which is another way of stating Proposition
2). But the reasons δ and η play similar roles should matter; and the reasons differ. As moral
philosophers have observed, if we try to achieve greater equality in consumption by increasing δ,
we run into a problem of intergenerational inequity. It seems to me we should experiment instead
with η, which is the tactic I have adopted here.
Even as I compose this paper, I realise that doing welfare economics is a delicate matter. There
is a fine dividing line between ethical thinking and authoritarian impulses. It is all well and good for
the ethicist to assume the high moral ground and issue instructions like a philosopher-king or a
Whitehall Mandarin, but social ethics contains an irremediably democratic element. If others
aren’t persuaded by the conclusions ethicists have reached, the policies they recommend ought
to take those others’ ethical viewpoints into account. If we are studying the character of optimum
policies in a deterministic world, I personally don’t know how to justify a δ that is much in excess
28 Ramsey (1928: 261) famously wrote that to discount future well-beings is “ethically indefensible and
arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.” That is, of course, not an argument; merely an
expression of one’s beliefs. Broome (1992) contains a summary of the arguments that support Ramsey’s
position.
29 Possible extinction of the human race offers a reason for δ > 0, but that is a different reason for positive
time discounting. We discuss that in Section 4. We should also bear in mind that infinite-horizon determin-
istic models are mathematical artifacts: we know Humanity will not survive forever.
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of zero; but if the protagonist for whom I am writing this paper is not persuaded by me, her view
should count equally and we should conduct sensitivity tests on δ as well.30
Nordhaus (1994, 2007) holds that δ and η ought to be calibrated to be consistent with: (i)
market interest rates (including interest rates offered in government bonds), (ii) observed values
of g(Ct), and (iii) rates of private and public saving and investment. This is an interesting, democratic
move, in that the idea is to infer δ and η from data generated by people’s behaviour as they go
about their daily lives - making decisions on how much to consume, how much to spend on their
children’s education, how much to save for their own future, what public policies to vote for, and
so on. However, many ethicists find the move unacceptable. Broome (2008) shows Aristotelian
disdain toward anything so crass as a reliance on observed “interest rates” for arriving at figures
for δ and η in public decision-making. He calls r in equation (6) the “money market” interest rate
- the terminological shift from “real” (as in the real productivity of capital) to “money” (as in
money market interest rates) is designed, presumably, to make Nordhaus’ move look ethically
bogus. Broome dismisses claims that Nordhaus’ approach reflects a democratic point of view,
and says democracy requires debate and deliberation as well as voting. Viewed from the Common
Room it could no doubt appear that citizens in functioning democracies are so thoughtless as not
to debate, deliberate, read newspapers, or turn on the news channel; but I rather doubt that
Broome’s view would resonate with the taxpaying public.
Nevertheless, there is a problem with Nordhaus’ stance when the object of study is climate
change, which, under “business as usual” involves a massive global commons problem. For all
we know, social rates of return on investment in energy intensive activities are negative today. But
the market economy wouldn’t tell us they are, because private rates of return would perforce be
positive (why else would anyone invest?). That alone is a reason why none of the private rates
can be regarded to be the consumption discount rate. An alternative would be to imagine that
consumers maximize expression (6). Suppose r* is the private rate of return on investment. The
idea now would be to estimate the two ethical parameters, δ and η, by studying consumer
behaviour. We could do that by imagining that, rather than equation (6), the two parameters
satisfy the condition, ρt = r*, where ρt is defined by equation (4). But ρt = r* is only one equation.
So we would have to estimate one of the unknowns from other types of data. There is then a
problem of consistency in the ways the parameters have been estimated in the different studies.
More importantly, it is most doubtful that even thoughtful households maximize expression (2).
As we noted earlier, the formula has no room for the “self.” So, even if it is accepted that
expression (2) should be used to inform public policy, there is a serious possibility that observed
behaviour offers a wrong basis for calibrating δ and η.
But in relying exclusively on revealed preference, Nordhaus has been consistent. Cline and Stern
would appear not to have bothered at all about consistency. They chose η on the basis of estimates
obtained from consumer behaviour, but ignored consumer behaviour entirely when it came to the
choice of δ and sought the advice of moral philosophers instead. This is an odd move.
Expressions (2) and (3) reduce the ethics underlying intergenerational welfare economics to two
parameters: δ and η. If, as I suggested earlier, the appropriate value for δ  in a deterministic world
is approximately zero, the whole weight of our ethical concerns regarding the distribution of
30  In this context, Arrow (1963) can be interpreted as an attempt to discover an aggregator function of
individual ethical preferences. It isn’t an accident that the title of his classic is “Social Choice and
Individual Values”. I have explored that interpretation in Dasgupta (2005).
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consumption across the generations is borne by η. That is an awful lot of work for a single
number to do adequately. But the assumption that η is independent of C has only tractability to
commend it. It seems to me many of the ethical puzzles thrown up by intergenerational welfare
economics have been due to that assumption. It may be time that economists experiment with Us
for which the elasticity of U'(C) is an increasing function of C.
3.5 Consumption Smoothing Among Whom?
Earlier I suggested that if we are to work with constant ηs, the range [2-4] suggests itself. But it
can be argued that even η = 3 flies against the face of revealed preference on foreign aid in the
contemporary world. Schelling (1999) has very reasonably noted that the rich world’s moral
posturing over the problem of global climate change doesn’t square with its reluctance to increase
foreign aid to poor countries beyond the very small proportion of income allocated to it today.
Recalling expression (1), if average consumption in the contemporary poor and rich worlds are
Cp and Cr, respectively, and Np and Nr are the sizes of their populations, world well-being today
would be (NpU(Cp) + NrU(Cr)). Now, Np exceeds Nr (Np≈3Nr) and Cr far exceeds Cp
(Cr≈20Cp). Schelling didn’t argue that climate change shouldn’t be taken seriously, but rather
that it would be more equitable and efficient to invest in reproducible and human capital now, so
as to build up the productive base of economies - including, especially, poor countries - and
divert funds to meet the problems of climate change at a later date, when people are a lot richer.
Schelling’s reasoning leads him to a point of view rather similar to that of Nordhaus.
It seems to me though that there is a reason why people in the rich world could justifiably translate
their concerns about equity into doing a lot more for “tomorrow’s them” than “today’s them.”
That has to do with incentives, governance, and responsibility. We should be anxious over the
plight of future generations caused by climate change because we are collectively responsible for
amplifying that change; the rich world especially so. If future generations inherit a hugely damaged
Earth, it is we who would be in part responsible. In contrast, it isn’t possible to trace the source
of absolute poverty in today’s poor countries solely to inequities in the global trading system.
There are many other reasons why the world’s poorest countries continue not to progress.
Governance is one of those reasons; and our protagonist, whom I introduced at the beginning of
this paper, could be forgiven for maintaining that, while she does join public demonstrations
against the inequities of the global trading system, there isn’t much she can do about bad governance
in other places. Interfering in foreign countries’ affairs excepting under extreme circumstances
violates other principles of international justice, such as respecting the autonomy of nations.
Matters are different within countries. The rich in Western democracies have been paying a lot
more than a mere 2% of their incomes for redistributive purposes. Our protagonist contributes
significantly to protect and promote her fellow citizens’ wellbeing. Stern (1976) calibrated η on
the basis of income tax rates in the United Kingdom when applied to the timeless model of
optimum income taxation due to Mirrlees (1971) and arrived at a specification of η = 2. That
said, climate change is predicted to inflict far more damage to the people in the tropics (the poor
world) than to the temperate zone (the rich world). Today’s rich world, which has been and
continues to be the site of the largest emissions of carbon per person, has a particular obligation
toward tomorrow’s people in today’s poor world. Increasing η from 1 to, say, 3 would accentuate
that obligation.31
31 Barrett (2003) contains an interesting discussion of those obligations.
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I don’t believe what I have offered is anything like an airtight argument. All I have done is to draw
attention to ethical principles that create an asymmetry between tomorrow’s “them” and today’s
“them.” Concern for future generations isn’t a case of misplaced ethics.
4. Intergenerational Well-Being: future uncertainty
Yaari (1965) showed that if Humanity is subject to a constant exogenous risk of extinction - say
at the hazard rate δ per year - each generation could reasonably pretend that there is no chance
of extinction, but discount future felicities at the hazard rate. Stern (2006) has justified the choice
of δ = 0.1% a year on that very basis.
4.1 Uncertain Constant Growth Rates and Hyperbolic Discounting
Humanity faces many risks and uncertainties. One particular risk is over future consumption,
conditional on Humanity being around. In an influential study, Weitzman (2001) sought to show
that the consumption discount rate society ought to choose would be hyperbolic if people differed
in their opinion of what the future holds. He invited some 2,800 economists to respond to a
questionnaire in which they were asked (p. 271) to submit a single number as their “best estimate
of the appropriate real discount rate to be used for evaluating environmental projects over a long
time horizon.” Weitzman also explained his motive (p. 271): “What I am after here is the relevant
interest rate for discounting real-dollar changes in future goods and services - as opposed to the
rate of pure time preference on (felicity).” In other words, economists were asked to submit their
best estimate of consumption discount rates and were told that they could submit only one number.
Weitzman’s defence of that restriction was that policy makers find it difficult to grasp consumption
discount rates that are not constant. I don’t know what policy makers would say if they were
informed of that particular view of their intellectual ability, but 2,160 economists from forty-nine
countries responded to the questionnaire. Each supplied a number, of which all but three were
non-negative. Forty-six respondents gave zero as their best estimate, while the rest supplied
positive numbers (Weitzman, 2001: Table 1). Weitzman found that if one were to ignore the
forty-nine non-positive numbers, the responses had the shape of a gamma distribution. He
interpreted the responses as draws from an urn by a policy maker who is uncertain of what fixed
rate to use for discounting social profits. Being uncertain, the policy maker selects investment
projects on the basis of the expected present discounted value (PDV) of the flow of social
profits. Weitzman showed that if the uncertain, but fixed, discount rate is governed by a gamma
distribution, the expected PDV of a project is proportional to a sure PDV of that same project,
but for which the rate used to discount future social profits is not a constant, but decreases over
time (starting as a positive number and declining to zero in the long run). Weitzman’s concluded
that the policy maker should use a positive but declining rate to discount social profits of long-
term investment projects. (Sozou, 1998, independently proved the same mathematical result,
but his motivation was entirely different. Sozou sought to explain hyperbolic discounting among
starlings and pigeons.)
As I felt unable to respond to Weitzman’s questionnaire, I didn’t send in a number. The stipulation
puzzled me then and it puzzles me even now. The horizon Weitzman wished to consider is 300
years or more. Why should it be insisted that my estimate of the consumption discount rate over
such a long period be a constant? To respond to the questionnaire would require of me to
suppose that consumption would change at a constant rate over a very long period of time
(equation (4)). It seemed to me that the questionnaire had restricted economic possibilities in an
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Weitzman (2007a) has revisited his earlier work and has altered the motivation behind his study.
Suppose that intergenerational wellbeing under uncertainty is the expected value of expression
(2). Imagine that g(Ct) - the growth rate in consumption - is an uncertain constant. Let j denote
a sample path and gj the constant growth rate in consumption along that path. Equation (4a) then
tells us that, if δ and the gjs are all small, the consumption discount rate along j is ρj = δ + ηgj.
Assume that there are a finite number of possible gjs. Let Πj be the subjective probability that gj
will prevail. Then Πj is also the subjective probability that ρj is the appropriate consumption
discount rate. Weitzman (2007a) shows that society can equivalently pretend that there is no
risk, but use a time varying consumption discount rate αt, where
αt = - ln(j∑(Πjexp(−ρjt)))/t. (11)
Equation (11) provides a justification for hyperbolic discounting in a societal context. It implies
that the certainty-equivalent consumption discount rate should decline over time from
α0 = j∑(Πj ρj ) to the limit, α∞= min {ρj }.
But as with the earlier questionnaire, there is a problem with this line of reasoning. I know of no
reason why we should be required to restrict the state space to constant growth paths. Presumably,
future consumption is uncertain because the production process is stochastic. So we should
model the stochastic process explicitly. In what follows we study optimum consumption plans
when future output is risky. The analysis will yield both stochastic and risk-free consumption
discount rates along optimum consumption sequences. It will be found that none is hyperbolic.
As in Section 3.3, our analysis can be extended to imperfect economies.
4.2 Consumption Discount Rates in an Uncertain Production Economy
Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) studied optimum policies in a world where, at each date, r in the
pure capital model of Section 3 (equation (5)) is drawn independently from the same probability
distribution.33 Imagine that (1+r) is a random draw from an urn in which, in each period, ln(1+r)
is distributed independently, identically, and normally, with mean µ and variance σ2. We take it
that µ and σ2 are known.
32 Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) have offered an explanation for hyperbolic discounting (preference reversal,
more generally) that is based on selection pressure over evolutionary time. They assume that the decision
maker has to choose between two options: (i) a reward, V (> 0), that will appear at an uncertain date (the
expected date being T), and (ii) a reward, V* (> 0), that too will appear at an uncertain date (the expected
date being T*). Assuming V* > V and T* > T, the authors show that, under quite general circumstances
concerning the distributions of the uncertain arrival times, a risk neutral decision maker would display
preference reversal (from V to V*) if neither reward appeared for a while. In the present paper, I am
studying social ethics, not private preferences. The viewpoint I am adopting here is that individual
behaviour based on hyperbolic discounting is a constraint the social evaluator must take into account
when he evaluates public policies, but that the evaluative criterion for social choice should be
intergenerational wellbeing (expression (2)).
33 The subsequent, asset-pricing literature (e.g., Brock, 1982) has explored models that are more general than
the one studied by Levhari and Srinivasan (1969). I use the Levhari-Srinivasan formulation to illustrate my
points because of its simplicity and because its findings are directly comparable to those discussed in
textbooks on asset pricing (e.g., Cochrane, 2005), where asset prices are taken to be exogenous stochastic
variables.
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Let    be the expected value of    . Assume   > δ. Obviously   is a function of µ and σ; as is the
variance of     .34 Assume that η ≥ 1. Levhari and Srinivasan showed that the optimum saving rate,
(Kt-Ct)/Kt, is
s`** =  (1+   )-(η-1)/η(1+δ)-1/ηexp[(η-1)σ2/2], (12)
provided the parameters , σ, η, and δ assume values for which s** < 1. For the moment, let us
suppose they do.35
Let    ** be the saving-output ratio.36 Assume that and δ are both small. A computation identical
to the one that yielded approximation (8a) reduces equation (12) to the approximation
**  ( -δ)/η  + (η-1)σ2/2 . (12a)
If the unit interval of time is made to smaller and smaller, approximation (12a) becomes better
and better. Notice that if η > 1, uncertainty in future productivity is a reason for saving more (the
precautionary motive for saving); but that if η = 1, uncertainty has no effect on s**. η = 1 is a bad
assumption in this model.
Consider a sample consumption sequence { }. Using equation (4) we know that the stochastic
consumption discount rate, , satisfies the equation
1 +   = (1+δ)(1+g( ))η. (13)
If δ and g( ) are both small, equation (13) reduces to the approximation,
  ≈ δ +ηg( ). (13a)
Imagine now that the social evaluator wants to avoid working with random variables and replaces
them with their expected values. The rate she should use to discount changes in expected future
consumption if she is to avoid making an error in computing optimum investment policies is called
the risk-free rate in the finance literature.37 Let that rate be   and let ** be the optimum
uncertain consumption at t. It can be shown that, provided δ and  are small,
 =  = δ + ηE[g( **)] - η2var[g( **)]/2,38 (14)
where E[g( **)] is the expected value of g( **) and var[g( **)] is the variance of g( **).
As E[g( **)] and var[g( **)] are both constants, the risk-free rate is a constant, not hyperbolic.
34 It is easy to show that, 1+  = exp(µ+ó2/2), (F4)
and var(1+ r` ) = var () = (exp(ó2)-1)exp(2µ+ó2). (F5)
 35 Notice that s** = s* (equation (8)) if σ = 0.
36 That is, s` **=[s**-(1+r`)-1]/[1-(1+r`)-1]. See footnote 24.
37 Among economists it would be called the “certainty-equivalent rate”.
38 The proof, which makes use of the assumption that (1+r) is drawn from a lognormal distribution, is similar
to the one that was used to arrive at equation (4a). The equation is familiar in the theory of finance
(Cochrane, 2005: p. 10). Notice that if ó = 0, equation (14) reduces to equation (4a).
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The third term on the right hand side of equation (14) shows that an increase in risk reduces the
risk-free rate, other things being equal.39 This feature of  is related to summary point (b) of
Section 3.1: an increase in risk raises the downside risk that the economy will hit very low
consumption levels in the future, and that lowers the risk-free rate.
In Dasgupta (2007) I argued that Stern and his co-authors ought to have tested the sensitivity of
their recommendations to the choice of η on grounds that without running tests, it isn’t possible to
tell whether η in the range 2-4 would have led them to recommend a greater immediate concern
for global climate change (i.e., do more now to ease the problem than would be recommended
by η = 1) or a less immediate concern (i.e., do less now to ease the problem than would be
recommended by η = 1). As they did not conduct such a test, it will be useful to summarise what
s** (equation (13)) tells us.
Proposition 3. η is not only an index of inequality aversion, it is also an index of risk
aversion. At the saving rate s**, future generations can be expected to be richer than the
present generation. Because of the growth effect, larger values of η recommend earlier
generations to save less for the future (the equity motive). However, as future productivity
is uncertain, larger values of η recommend earlier generations to save more (the
precautionary motive). The combined effect depends on the parameters η, δ,  and σ.
Economists working on climate change have tended to set η = 1. We found that η = 2 or 3 yield
more reasonable recommendations about saving rates in the deterministic version of the pure
capital model of Section 3.2. Consider η = 3. Equation (12) says that whether society ought to
save more for the future or less if η = 3 than it ought to if η = 1 depends on whether σ2 is greater
or less than 2ln((1+ )/(1+δ))/3. That  and σ contribute to the answer in opposition to one
another is what intuition should have told us.
It will prove instructive to experiment with values of η higher than 1. As before, assume  = 4%
a year and δ = 0.1% a year. Assume also that σ/µ = 1. From approximation (12a) we find that
the optimum saving-output ratio is 52% if η = 2, and 38% if η = 3. On comparing these figures
with the corresponding numbers we arrived at for σ = 0 (Section 3), we note that if η = 2, the risk
in future productivity of capital is a reason for raising the saving-output ratio from 49% to 52%;
whereas, if η = 3, that same risk is a reason for raising the saving-output ratio from 32% to 38%.
The precautionary motive for saving is noticeable even if the risk is relatively small.
The precautionary motive would seem to increase rapidly with uncertainty. For example, suppose
σ/µ = 2. If η = 3, the optimum saving-output ratio is 48%, which is a considerable increase from
the figure of 32% in the absence of risk.
5. Large Uncertainties
All that said, we shouldn’t believe any model that explicitly models risk when the horizon extends
100-200 years into the future. We simply don’t know what the probabilities are. If we were to
acknowledge this in the Levhari-Srinivasan model, we would say that  and σ are themselves
unknown. Estimating them from observations raises the problem that we are required to make a
39 Approximation (12a) summarized a related finding, that the optimum saving rate increases with increasing
risk.
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forecast of future realizations of  over the indefinite future, but have data on only a finite number
of its past realizations. Worse, we will continue to observe only a finite number of realizations.
Pesaran et al. (2007) and Weitzman (2007a,b) have shown that the probability distributions
over the uncertain  and σ can plausibly have a thick lower tail, implying that a long, long run of
low realizations of   would not be improbable. In the context of global climate change, this
reasoning becomes relevant, because we have little-to-no usable record from a world where the
mean global temperature was, say, 3 degrees Celsius above the current level.
In the Levhari-Srinivasan model, however,  and σ are assumed to be known. So, with one
hand tied behind our back, let us interpret the econometrician’s message as being that σ is “large.”
By assumption, ln(1+ ) is normally distributed. But that implies that the distribution is thin-
tailed. So we want to identify the implications for the optimum saving rate when the risk is thin-
tailed but “large.” In Section 4 it was assumed that the values of the parameters, δ, η, , and σ
fall within a range for which s** is less than 1. However, equation (12) says that s** ≥1 if
 σ2/2≥ln(1+δ)/η(η-1) + ln(1+ )/η. (14)
As s** 1 is nonsensical, we can summarise the finding as
Proposition 4. If σ satisfies inequality (14), no optimum policy exists.
How large must the uncertainty be for inequality (14) to hold? Let σ* be the value of σ at which
(14) is an equality; implying that, for values of σ in excess of σ*, inequality (14) holds strictly.
Suppose, as earlier, that δ = 0.1% a year, η = 3, and  = 4% a year. Routine computations show
that σ* 0.17. Now, when  = 4%, the value of µ that corresponds to σ* 0.17 is approximately
0.027; which implies a coefficient of variation, σ*/µ, of a bit over 7. This is large, but perhaps not
remarkably so. And yet, no optimum policy exists. Suppose η = 2 instead. We should expect σ*/
µ to be larger than the previous figure. This is indeed so. If η = 2, σ*=0.20 and µ=0.019, which
implies that σ*/µ is a little over 10.
Proposition 4 holds that if σ satisfies (14), for any saving rate there is a higher saving rate for
which the expected value of intergenerational wellbeing is higher. But at 100% saving rate no one
ever consumes anything. We therefore have a contradiction. Another way to interpret Proposition
4 is to say that if σ satisfies inequality (14), the problem of optimum saving, when formulated in
terms of expected wellbeing over an infinite horizon, is so inadequately posed as to defy an
answer. Consumption discount rates cannot be defined and social cost-benefit analysis of projects
becomes meaningless. To be sure, for any value of σ, no matter how large, one can always
choose η to be sufficiently close to 1 to ensure that inequality (14) does not hold. But as values
of η close to 1 carry with them serious ethical deficiencies, choosing a figure for η close to 1
would not be a legitimate way out of the dilemma. To do so would be a technical fix, nothing
more. So we search for more defendable escape routes from the ethical dilemma.
Integrated assessment models consider only a finite number of scenarios, implying that the downside
risks associated with climate change are bounded. In the context of our model here, we could
ensure the existence of an optimum programme by truncating the normal distribution of ln(1+r)
on the left. But there is no ready recipe for determining where we should perform the truncation.
Another escape route would be to abandon the assumption that U(C) is unbounded below (i.e.,
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η≥1, for very low consumption levels) and assume instead that no matter how greatly the economy
were to be hit by bad luck, the loss in well-being people would suffer from is bounded. But we
economists have very limited experience of working with U’s for which the elasticity of U' (C) is
less than one for low Cs and greater than one for high Cs.
So we turn to two assumptions underlying expression (2) that are surely artificial: the constant
hazard rate (δ) for Humanity’s extinction and an infinite horizon. One way to ensure that the
ethical framework we invoke doesn’t have contradictions no matter how high σ is would be to to
abandon the infinite time horizon. But the choice of a terminal date would at best be arbitrary.
That is why economists have avoided working with finite time horizon models.
Another possible way out would be to continue to postulate an infinite time horizon, but formalise
Humanity’s extinction process in terms of a hazard rate that increases in an unbounded fashion
over time at a sufficiently high rate. The problem is that we have little intuition on how to formulate
that in a way that is scientifically reasonable.
6. Avoiding Misplaced Concreteness
In this paper I have offered a fairly complete account of the idea of consumption discount rates
as applied to public policy analysis. Sections 1-2 introduced the language we economists use to
formalize the notion of “social” discount rates. The background of the discussion in the paper has
been the global climate change that accompanies an accumulation of “greenhouse” gases in the
atmosphere. Because of the externalities generated by individuals’ emissions of those gases,
observed rates of return on investment are very likely overestimates of social rates of return. So,
using even the rates on offer in government bonds for discounting long lived projects is very likely
to be misleading. In Section 3, where I presented a simple deterministic model of consumption
and saving, I argued that consumption discount rates are neither ethical primitives nor observables
as market rates of return on investment, but that they ought instead to be derived from economic
forecasts and society’s conception of distributive justice concerning the allocation of goods and
services across personal identities, time, and events. The welfare theory was developed in the
context of three empirical studies on the economics of global climate change: Cline (1992),
Nordhaus (1994), and Stern (2006). One striking feature of the ethics underlying intergenerational
welfare economics that all three protagonists have adopted is that it is characterized by only two
parameters: δ (the time discount rate) and η (the elasticity of marginal felicity). If, as many moral
philosophers advise us, the appropriate value for δ in a deterministic world is approximately
zero, the whole weight of the ethics regarding the distribution of consumption across the generations
is borne by η. That’s an awful lot of work for a single number to do adequately. Curiously, both
Nordhaus and Stern have assumed η = 1. I have shown that in classroom models a combination
of δ = 0 and η = 1 can together prescribe absurdly high saving ratios. If we are to maintain the
assumption that the elasticity of U' (C) is a constant, we should work with higher values of η,
perhaps in the region, 1.5 to 3. But the assumption that η is independent of C has only tractability
to commend it. It seems that many of the ethical puzzles thrown up by intergenerational welfare
economics and reviewed in this paper have been due to that assumption. It may be time that
economists experiment with Us for which the elasticity of U' (C) is an increasing function of C.
The standard precautionary motive for saving was reviewed in the case where future uncertainties
are not large (Section 4). It was shown that uncertainty in future consumption does not per se
lead to hyperbolic discounting, but that, to generate the latter requires the state space to be
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artificially confined. In a natural generalization of the pure capital model of Section 3, where the
gross return on saving is generated by an i.i.d process involving a log normal distribution, it was
shown that the risk-free consumption discount rate along the optimum saving rule is constant, not
hyperbolic.
In Section 5 we found that if the uncertainties associated with climate change losses are large, the
formulation of intergenerational well-being we economists have grown used to could lead to
ethical paradoxes even when the uncertainties are thin-tailed: an optimum policy may not exist
(Proposition 4). Various modelling avenues that offer a way out of the dilemma were discussed.
It was shown that none of them is entirely satisfactory.
The (linear) model economy we have worked with in this paper is utterly simple. Nevertheless it
has yielded several insights that are relevant to the study of the economics of climate change. The
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is currently 385 p.p.m. (parts per million), a
figure which ice cores in Antarctica have revealed to be in excess of the maximum that had been
reached during the past 650,000 years and more. Since the late 1970s, climate change has been
taken seriously by those who have studied the science. Even the now-famous “hockey-stick”,
displayed by time series of carbon concentration in the atmosphere, appeared some time ago
(Bolin, 1989: fig. 5). Moreover the Earth system is driven by interlocking non-linear processes
running at differing speeds and operating at different spatial scales. Doing little about climate
change would involve Earth crossing an unknown number of tipping points (formally, separatrices)
in the global climate system.40 We have no data on the consequences if Earth were to cross those
tipping points. They could be good in some places, disastrous in others. And even if we did have
data, they would probably do us little good, because Nature’s processes are irreversible. One
implication of Earth system’s deep non-linearities is that estimates of climatic parameters based
on observations from the recent past are unreliable for making forecasts about the state of the
world at concentration levels of 560 p.p.m. or more. The uncertainties are therefore enormous.
Proposition 4 exposes the limitation of overly formal analyses of the economics of climate change.
(We should add to that the economics of biodiversity loss.) Because advancements in global
sequestration technologies and technologies using alternative sources of energy may prove to be
harder to realise than is currently hoped, it is possible to believe that Humanity should invest a lot
more in reducing climate change than the 2% of the GDP of rich countries proposed by Stern
(2006). One can hold such a belief even while being unable to justify it from formal modelling.
Intergenerational welfare economics raises more questions than it is able to answer satisfactorily.
The ideas I apply here were presented in my Plenary Lecture to the World Congress of
Environmental and Resource Economists, held in Monterey, California, June 2002, and were
explored in Dasgupta (2001: Ch. 11). For discussions and correspondence over the years, I am
very grateful to Kenneth Arrow, Geir Asheim, and Karl-Göran Mäler. While revising the paper I
have benefited greatly from the comments of William Cline, William Nordhaus, Kip Viscusi, and
Martin Weitzman.
40 See Lenton et al. (2007).
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